If I sat down with a philosopher in ancient Greece, I could explain the theory of evolution to them so that they could understand its essence and reproduce it faithfully. For the purposes of this thought experiment, please ignore the small details of it requiring a time machine or me not speaking ancient Greek.
The reason that the ancient Greeks, or any other ancients, didn’t come up with the theory of evolution themselves is that it explains something that wasn’t obvious needed explaining. In the ancient world, few people were wondering why there are so many different animals and plants, and why they were so similar to each other. Darwin’s genius was to recognize that this required an explanation, and then to provide it. The theory was so simple that Thomas Henry Huxley, when he learned about it, said, “How extremely stupid of me not to have thought of that!”
Consciousness is fundamentally different. It’s been obvious for a long time that its existence and functioning is something that requires explaining, yet no explanation has come forth. That’s even though thousands of neuroscientists, philosophers, computer scientists and others have tried to provide such an explanation for decades. There are now many interesting ways of looking at consciousness. Many of them are of the type “everyone has been thinking about consciousness the wrong way.” Michael Pollan, in his new book, A World Appears, covers some of the most interesting ideas. There is little agreement which ones are helpful, and none of them offer much explanatory power.
This is why I predict that there’s never going to be a theory of consciousness that has similar explanatory power to the theory of evolution, and is as easily communicated to the layperson. There’s unlikely to ever be a Darwin for consciousness, or a Huxley to exclaim, “How stupid of me not to have thought of that.”
Here are more of my thoughts on A World Appears.